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Abstract 
Kendler argues for the reality of psychiatric diagnostic classes in terms of two realist theories 
of truth, coherence and correspondence. I would advocate an alternative interpretation of the 
truth status of diagnostic classifications that leads to different conclusions. This is based 
firstly on Karl Popper’s ideas on the growth of knowledge, whereby hypotheses developed 
from theoretical conjectures are deliberately subjected to attempts at refutation (we refine 
our always provisional views of what is true by increasing our knowledge of what is false).  
My second source of argument is John Wing’s view that diseases are theoretical constructs 
on which disease theories may be based and tested. Such theories relate variously to 
aetiology, pathology, treatment, course and outcome. Rejecting a disease theory does not 
force rejection of the disease construct it seeks to qualify. We adhere to disease constructs 
more strongly than to the disease theories based on them. However, if it becomes apparent 
that the information obtained by testing disease theories is incoherent, we may eventually 
jettison particular disease constructs, as has happened regularly in the history of medicine. 
The disease constructs used in psychiatry may be approaching this point.  
I thank the editors for inviting me to comment on Dr Kendler’s interesting paper on the 
standing of psychiatric diagnostic classes. He starts by setting out three philosophical 
positions: instrumentalism, and two realist theories of truth (the coherence and 
correspondence theories). Kendler prefers realism to instrumentalism, as I do. There are 
philosophical differences between coherence and correspondence. Coherence is concerned 
with the relationship between statements about the world (ie, it is good if the statements 
describing related aspects of reality are consistent with each other). Correspondence goes 
further, in that it implies there can be links between statements and the state of affairs in the 
real world. The two theories appear to be of interest to Kendler partly because they are 
distinguished by stringency: the coherence theory of reality is less demanding than that of 
correspondence, and if we cannot have the latter, we might still make a case for the former. 
He then argues that the quality of reality can be taken to attach to psychiatric diagnostic 
classes, particularly if we accept a coherence view of truth. Kendler thinks that human 
mental suffering as a whole may meet the criteria for correspondence, but that individual 
psychiatric categories can only meet the requirements of coherence theory (the example he 
gives is schizophrenia). At the very least he would like the truth standing of the categories to 
be persistent, if not eternal. For this reason he dislikes arguments based on "pessimistic 
induction", the idea that we have always been wrong before, and so in all probability we will 
be wrong again.  
The correspondence and coherence theories of reality are both based on consensus. 
Consensus is cosy, but cannot certify truth. Moreover the frailty of these two theories of 
reality is not historical (as posited by pessimistic induction: “we always have been wrong”) 
but logical (“we always can be wrong”). I will interpret the matters raised by Kendler by using 
the ideas of Karl Popper (1963) and John Wing (Bebbington, 2011)1 to make sense of the 
procedures and purposes of diagnostic classification in psychiatry.  
Popper used Tarski's exposition of the correspondence theory of truth to develop his ideas 
of the role of deduction in science (Popper 1963, pp 223-227). A deductive inference is valid 
if no counter-example exists, and, Popper argues, we therefore have a method of objective 
critical testing at our disposal, the deliberate and active seeking of counter-examples. This 
argument forms the basis for the role of refutation in scientific theory testing. Popper also 
points out that there is no equivalent rule of inductive inference: however much it may assist 
consensus, the accretion of positive evidence can never substantiate the validity of the 
premises. For this reason we can never be sure that the future will be like the past.  
However, Popper argued that the growth of scientific knowledge can be logically secured if 
we subject theoretical conjectures to rigorous attempts to refute them. A hypothesis is 
corroborated when the application of crucial tests fails to refute it. However, corroboration is 
not confirmation: the acceptance of the theory is always provisional (this is the Popperian 
refinement of the idea of pessimistic induction). Popper’ position is actually quite 
conservative. Thus he argues that a theory should not be jettisoned just because it is 
refuted. This should occur only when it can be replaced by the exposition of a theory more 
precise or more comprehensive, a Darwinian selection of ideas. Finally, he acknowledges 
that a theory that has been superseded may still be useful as an everyday approximation 
(vide Newtonian mechanics). 
Wing adapted these ideas to the problems of psychiatric classification. He noted theories in 
medicine are unusual, in that they are based on the concept of the syndrome. Syndromes 
are leaps of imagination (conjectures), but they are then accepted and maintained by 
consensus, these days in the Byzantine ecumenical councils of DSM and ICD. Wing saw 
medical (and hence psychiatric) disorders as theoretical constructs that are accepted 
provisionally by consensus about the content of the syndromes that identify them. Once 
such theoretical constructs gain acceptance, they can be used as the basis of individual 
disease theories. These generate specific hypotheses about putative consistencies, relating 
to aetiology, pathology, treatment, course and outcome. This separation of theoretical 
disease constructs from the expository theories based on them allows two levels of potential 
rejection. In particular, rejecting a disease theory does not force rejection of the disease 
construct it seeks to qualify. We are more ready to reject disease theories than we are to 
abandon the formulation of individual disorders, quite properly so. Some syndromes are 
more successful than others. Where they prove useful in having a consistent aetiology, 
course, treatment, and when they can be linked to consistently differentiating pathological 
mechanisms, they will be adhered to, although not necessarily forever. The erstwhile 
disorders listed by Kendler were usually relinquished over many years, as it gradually 
became apparent they were not useful in such terms.  
Given this formulation, what light does it cast on the current status of psychiatric 
classification? It is always possible to create discriminating algorithms after the manner of 
DSM and ICD. This enables us to identify cases reliably, but does not ensure validity. Do our 
diagnostic categories effectively discriminate symptomatically between healthy and 
unhealthy individuals (the threshold problem)? Are they symptomatically mutually exclusive 
(the boundary problem)? Do they predict aetiology, pathology, appropriate treatment and 
prognosis with any degree of specificity? If they are unable to do these things, it strongly 
suggests the intellectual foundations of the syndromal categories are insecure. Does that 
mean they have no heuristic value at all? 
If we consider Kendler’s specific example of schizophrenia, the answers to the questions 
above are generally negative. Psychotic phenomena appear to exist on a continuum, and 
the environmental and genetic aetiology of schizophrenia is common to other psychiatric 
categories. The course of psychotic phenomena is quite variable, and they can be treated, 
usually imperfectly, with a number of different agents, both pharmacological and 
psychological. Kendler is clearly in the camp of optimistic induction. However, in my view, 
the syndrome of schizophrenia may be slowly losing its scientific persuasiveness. At best, it 
may retain a degree of heuristic value. It enables us to identify people whom we may 
investigate in order to determine psychological and biological mechanisms with relevance 
both inside and outside the group investigated, and this is, I think, valuable. It has certainly 
generated extremely interesting findings in recent years. However, this residual value does 
not really allow claims of reality beyond the instrumentalist position. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that psychiatric diagnoses have social functions, linked 
to, but separate from, their scientific function. These are not always benign (they may be the 
basis of stigma), but they include access to resources in both disorder-driven and problem-
driven health systems, and they impact on issues of criminal and social responsibility. 
 
1 My attempt at an intellectual obituary for Wing.  
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